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ZONING CONTROL OF AIRPORT EXPANSION BY





THE DALLAS/FORT WORTH International Airport
(DFW Airport) is owned by the cities of Dallas and Fort
Worth, but is primarily located within the city limits of
Grapevine, Irving and Euless, Texas.' After almost
twenty-five years of acquiescence, these cities are now de-
manding a say in the land use control of the airport
2
through newly enacted zoning ordinances.3
This dispute was foreshadowed ten years ago when the
syndicated television show The MacNeil/Lehrer Report de-
voted an entire show to the potential destruction of the
concept of home rule cities.4 The panel of experts on the
broadcast feared the emasculation of the power enjoyed
by home rule cities due to a ruling by the U.S. Supreme
Court which concluded that home rule cities were not im-
mune from lawsuits challenging their police powers.5 The
Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Tex.
1974).
2 D/FW Board Seeks To Block Local Restrictions On Expansion, AIRPORTS, Apr. 17,
1990, at 168.
3 Grapevine, Tex., Ordinance 89-81, 89-82 (Dec. 21, 1989); Irving, Tex., Ordi-
nance 5732, 5733 (Jan. 4, 1992); Euless, Tex., Ordinance 1016 (Nov. 28, 1989).
4 The MacNeil/Lehrer Report: Taking Cities to Court (Educational Broadcasting tele-
vision broadcast, May 25, 1982). For a definition of Home Rule city, see infra note
61 and accompanying text.
5 Id.
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panel concluded that the traditional police power enjoyed
by home rule cities is subject to attack wherever the po-
tential for gain is the greatest. 6 Zoning, land use controls
and the operation of airports involve very high stakes and
are therefore natural targets.7 Consequently, it should be
no surprise that DFW Airport is challenging the host cit-
ies in court over the authority of the host cities to regulate
the airport's land use."
This Comment will discuss the relevant issues control-
ling the battle over zoning control of airports located
outside of the municipalities which own them, using the
DFW Airport dispute as the exemplary framework. The
primary issues for consideration are: (1) whether the zon-
ing ordinances are pre-empted by state law; (2) whether
they are pre-empted by federal law; and (3) whether the
airport board has the authority of eminent domain to con-
demn streets and roads within the host cities.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DFW AIRPORT
CONTROVERSY
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport was built in
1974 and was the last major U.S. airport to be con-
structed.9 For many years before the construction of
DFW Airport, the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth main-
tained two separate airports.10 Although the downtown
centers of the two cities are approximately thirty-one
miles apart, expansion of their borders throughout the
years has made them almost contiguous in many places."
6 Id.
7 Id.
1 See Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving, Texas, appeal docketed,
No. 05-92-00559-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas)(appeal by Airport Board from grant of
summary judgment to the host cities in Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City
of Irving, Texas, No. 90-4298-I (Dist. Ct. of Dallas County, 162nd Judicial Dist. of
Texas, Oct. 8, 1991)).
11 Carole A. Shifrin, Officials Hope Capacity Crisis Will Spur Expansion of Airports,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1987, at 83.
10 City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp 1015, 1019 (N.D. Tex.




In 1968, the cities agreed that the maintenance of two
separate municipal airports was not in the interests of
either community and decided to pool their resources to
construct a new regional airport to serve the joint metro-
politan area. 12 DFW Airport was constructed within the
city limits of Grapevine, Irving and Euless, with only a
very small portion located in Fort Worth.' 3 All of the air-
line terminal buildings, as well as the only highway serv-
icing the airport, are within Grapevine. 14 Since 1974,
DFW Airport has grown to become the second busiest air-
port in the world, 15 with the number of passenger trips
utilizing the airport increasing from 6.8 million in 1974,
to 21 million in 1987.16
The expansion of airline traffic has not been limited to
DFW Airport, however. The number of airline trips taken
by Americans more than doubled to 440 million trips be-
tween the time of DFW Airport's construction and 1987.17
Worldwide air traffic will reach two billion trips per year
by the year 2000.18 Even though commercial air traffic is
experiencing steady growth, it is doubtful that many new
major airports will be built in the future. 19 One author
has predicted that future increases in airport capacity will
come from expansion of existing facilities by constructing
new runways, taxiways and larger apron areas. °
Since the beginning of airline deregulation in 1978,2 1 a
crisis atmosphere has existed in the area of airport capac-
12 Id. at 1019-20.
11 Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Tex.
1974).
14 Id.
"- Steven R. Reed, FAA Backs Impact Statement For DFW Airport Expansion, Hous.
CHRON., Jan. 7, 1992, at Al 1.
16 Brief for Appellant at 5, Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving,
Texas, appeal docketed, (Tex. App.-Dallas) No. 05-92-00559-CV [hereinafter Ap-
pellant's Brief].




21 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 5.
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ity. 22 The hub-and-spoke method of airline operation,
which has prevailed since deregulation, places heavy de-
mands on hub airports.23 DFW Airport is the hub airport
for two major passenger air carriers, American Airlines
and Delta Airlines, as well as the freight air carrier United
Parcel Service.2 4 In 1986, the fifty busiest commercial air-
ports handled eighty percent of all passenger boardings2
The growth of aviation demand at DFW Airport has led
all major U.S. airports. 6 Bad weather or other problems
at a hub airport can cause delays which "ripple across the
country. ' 27 Currently, DFW Airport experiences more
than 50,000 hours of flight delay annually. 28
Against this background, DFW Airport has undertaken
a proposed $3.5 billion expansion program that includes
expanding the current 5,000 foot runway 16/34 East to a
length of 8,500 feet.29 A new 9,760 foot runway 16/34
West is also planned.30 The DFW Airport Board refused
to submit its expansion plan to any of the host cities for
approval. 3'
After the DFW Airport Board announced its plans for
expansion, the cities of Grapevine, Irving and Euless
promptly enacted zoning ordinances requiring approval
by the respective cities prior to any new airport construc-
tion within their boundaries.3 2 Although all of the ordi-
nances contain procedures for governmental entities
(such as Dallas and Fort Worth) to obtain immunity from
the ordinances, neither the Airport Board nor Dallas or
22 Shifin, supra note 9, at 83.
23 Id.
24 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 4.
25 Shifrin, supra note 9, at 83.
26 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 6.
27 Shifrin, supra note 9, at 83.
28 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 6.
21 Irving, Texas, Offers to Negotiate DFW Expansion, AIRPORTS, Jan. 8, 1991, at 16.
30 FAA Issues Environmental Impact Statement For DFW Airport, AVIATION DAILY, Jan.
7, 1992, at 25.
I Brief of Appellee at 9, Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving,
Texas, appeal docketed, (Tex. App.-Dallas) No. 05-92-00559-CV [hereinafter Ap-
pellee's Brief].
32 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 7.
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Fort Worth has sought such immunity.33
Grapevine enacted Ordinance 89-8231 which reclassi-
fied the zoning of DFW Airport property from a Dallas-
Fort Worth International Airport district to a Governmen-
tal Use (GU) district. Grapevine Ordinance No. 89-813-
requires that a GU zoned district can be used for an air-
port only after the issuance of a conditional use permit by
the city.
Irving's Ordinance No. 573336 requires that airport
property must be rezoned to an S-P-i Site Plan or S-P-2
Site Plan district prior to an airport being "altered, cre-
ated, established, extended or expanded.3 7 The portion
of the DFW Airport property which is within the city limits
of Irving is currently zoned as an "S-P Site Plan district,
which is a zoning district classification that was repealed
in 1973, prior to the opening of DFW Airport. 8 Irving's
Ordinance No. 5732 requires that any property zoned to a
repealed district be governed by the requirements origi-
nally set forth for the repealed district.39 The repealed
district that governed the portion of the DFW Airport
property located in Irving required the use of that portion
of DFW Airport to conform to a 1969 document prepared
by the DFW Airport Board entitled "Airport Land Use
Plan - 2001.1"40 The 1969 land use plan does not include
the two new runways proposed in the DFW expansion
pro gram.4
Euless' Ordinance No. 1016 requires the issuance of a
special use permit by the city before any property may be
used for an airport.42 Additionally, any airport property
must be located within an "1-2, Heavy Industrial" dis-
s3 Appellee's Brief, supra note 31, at 10.
34 Grapevine, Tex., Ordinance No. 89-82 (Dec. 21, 1989).
3.1 Grapevine, Tex., Ordinance No. 89-81 (Dec. 21, 1989).
36 Irving, Tex., Ordinance No. 5733 (Jan. 4, 1990).
37 Id.
s1 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 9.
39 Irving, Tex., Ordinance No. 5732 (Jan. 4, 1992).
40 Irving, Tex., Ordinance No. 2286 (Mar. 30, 1972).
41 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 9.
42 Euless, Tex., Ordinance No. 1016 (Nov. 28, 1989).
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trict.43 Prior to the enactment of Euless Ordinance No.
1016, the DFW Airport property was not part of any Eu-
less zoning district. 44
The DFW Airport Board filed suit against the three cit-
ies in Texas State District Court in response to what the
Board perceived as a threat to their expansion plans by
these zoning ordinances.4 5 The communities responded
with countersuits against the Airport Board.46 Against
this historical background, the next section of this com-
ment analyzes the legal issues presented by this dispute.
III. STATE LAW PRE-EMPTION
The first question to be decided in determining if the
host cities may regulate land use at DFW airport is
whether the local zoning ordinances have been pre-
empted by state law. The applicable state law is the Texas
Municipal Airports Act.
A. THE TEXAS MUNICIPAL AIRPORTS ACT
The DFW Airport Board was established on September
27, 1965 under the authority of the Texas Municipal Air-
ports Act 47 (hereinafter "the Act").48 The Act was en-
acted by the Texas Legislature in 194749 to provide broad
powers to Texas municipalities for the purpose of, among
other things, "providing for acquisition, construction,
maintenance, operation and regulation by municipalities
and counties of airports and air navigation facilities.5 °
Additionally, the Act provides "for the creation by coun-
ties and municipalities of airport officers, boards or agen-
43 Id.
44 Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 8.
4. D/FW Board Seeks To Block Local Restrictions On Expansion, AIRPORTS, Apr. 17,
1990, at 168.
46 Communities File Countersuit Against Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Board, AIRPORTS,
May 15, 1990, at 211.
41 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, §§ 1-22 (Vernon 1992).
- Appellant's Brief, supra note 16, at 4.
4, Acts of 1947, 50th Leg., R.S., ch. 114, §§ 1-22, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 183.
50 Id.
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cies to administer certain powers over airports and air
navigation facilities."'" The Act gives municipalities es-
tablishing airports wide-ranging powers.52
Thus, the Act grants broad powers to municipalities en-
gaging in the operation of airports or air navigation facili-
ties. In addition, the Act authorizes public agencies
(including municipalities) to make agreements for joint
action 53 and to act together through a joint airport
51 Id.
52 Section 2 of the Act provides:
Every municipality is authorized, out of any appropriations or other
moneys made available for such purposes, to plan, establish, de-
velop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regu-
late, protect and police airports and air navigation facilities, either
within or without the territorial limits of such municipality and
within or without the territorial boundaries of this State, including
the construction, installation, equipment, maintenance and opera-
tion at such airports of any buildings and other facilities....
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 2 (Vernon 1992).
53 Section 14(b) states:
Agreement. Any two (2) or more public agencies may enter into
agreements with each other for joint action pursuant to the provi-
sions of this Act and any two (2) or more municipalities are specially
authorized to make such agreement or agreements as they may
deem necessary for the joint acquisition and operation of airports,
air navigation facilities, or airport hazard areas. Concurrent action
by ordinance, resolution or otherwise of the governing bodies of the
participating public agencies shall constitute joint action. Each such
agreement shall specify its duration, the proportionate interest
which each public agency shall have in the property, facilities and
privileges involved, the proportion to be borne by each public
agency of preliminary costs and costs of acquisition, establishment,
construction, enlargement, improvement, and equipment, or the air-
port or air navigation facility, or airport hazard area the proportion
of the expenses of maintenance, operation, regulation and protec-
tion thereof to be borne by each and such other terms as are re-
quired by the provisions of this Section. The agreement may also
provide for: amendments thereof, and conditions and methods of
termination of the agreement; the disposal of all or any of the prop-
erty, facilities and privileges jointly owned, prior to or upon said
property, facilities and privileges, or any part thereof, ceasing to be
used for the purposes provided in this Act, or upon termination of
the agreement; the distribution of the proceeds received upon any
such disposal, and of any funds or other property jointly owned and
undisposed of; the assumption or payment of any indebtedness aris-
ing from the joint venture which remains unpaid upon the disposal
of all assets or upon a termination of the agreement; and such other
provisions as may be necessary or convenient.
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board.54 The power of thejoint board is subject to limita-
tions which are not material to the present discussion. 55
The Act grants broad powers to a municipality in its op-
eration of an airport, and these same powers extend to a
joint Airport Board that acts on behalf of multiple constit-
uent municipalities. 6 The question of whether the host
city ordinances are null under the Act turns on whether
the powers granted by the Act pre-empt the powers
granted to the host cities by the Texas Constitution.
B. THE POWERS OF HOME RULE CITIES
There are three types of municipal incorporation in the
State of Texas.57 Cities may be incorporated under the
general laws of the state, by special law, or under home
rule charter.5 8 The cities of Grapevine, Irving and Euless,
as well as the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, are Texas
home rule cities.59 Home rule cities are empowered by a
1912 amendment to Article XI, Section 5 of the Texas
Constitution. 60 The home rule amendment provides that
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 14(b) (Vernon 1992).
4 Section 14(c) states:
Joint Board. Public agencies acting jointly pursuant to this Section
shall create a joint board which shall consist of members appointed
by the governing body of each participating public agency. The
number to be appointed, their term and compensation, if any, shall
be provided for in the joint agreement. Each such joint board shall
organize, select officers for terms to be fixed by the agreement, and
adopt and amend from time to time rules for its own procedure.
The joint board shall have power to plan, acquire, establish, de-
velop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regu-
late, protect and police any airport, air navigation facility, or airport
hazard area to be jointly acquired, controlled and operated, and
such board may exercise on behalf of its constituent public agencies
all the powers of each with respect to such airport, air navigation
facility or airport hazard, subject to the limitations of Subsection (d)
of this Section.
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 14(c) (Vernon 1992).
5 Id. § 14(d).
See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
57 City of Sherman v. Municipal Gas Co., 133 Tex. 324, 327, 127 S.W.2d 193,
195 (1939).
- Id. at 195.
.9 Appellee's Brief, supra note 31, at 30.
0 Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 165, 214 S.W.2d 282, 285 (1948).
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cities of five thousand or more inhabitants may adopt and
amend city charters by a majority vote of qualified voters,
subject only to the limitation that nothing in their charters
may be inconsistent with the Texas Constitution or acts of
the Texas Legislature."'
Subsequent to the home rule amendment, the Legisla-
ture enacted the Enabling Act 62 which enumerated thirty-
four specific powers available to home rule cities.6 3 To
remove any doubt that the enumerated powers were
merely a non-exhaustive exemplary list, the Legislature
went on to specifically state that the enumeration of pow-
ers should never be used to infer that a home rule city has
anything less than plenary power, subject only to consis-
tency with the State Constitution. 64 It is therefore appar-
ent that both the DFW Airport Board and the host cities
61 The Home Rule amendment reads as follows:
Cities having more than five thousand (5000) -inhabitants may, by
majority vote of the qualified voters of said city, at an election held
for that purpose, adopt or amend their charters, subject to such limi-
tations as may be prescribed by the Legislature, and no charter or
any ordinance passed under said charter shall contain any provision
inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws
enacted by the Legislature of this State. Said cities may levy, assess
and collect such taxes as may be authorized by law or by their char-
ters; but no tax for any purpose shall ever be lawful for any one year,
which shall exceed two and one-half percent. of the taxable property
of such city, and no debt shall ever be created by any city, unless at
the same time provision be made to assess and collect annually a
sufficient sum to pay the interest thereon and creating a sinking fund
of at least two per cent. thereon. Furthermore, no city charter shall
be altered, amended or repealed oftener than every two years.
TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
62 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1175 (Vernon 1992).
63 Id.
64 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1176 (Vernon 1987). The text of the Further
Powers Article is as follows:
The enumeration of powers hereinabove made shall never be con-
strued to preclude, by implication or otherwise, any such city from
exercising the powers incident to the enjoyment of local self-govern-
ment, provided that such powers shall not be inhibited by the State
Constitution.
Id.
This article was repealed by Acts of 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 149, § 49(1), which
also enacted the Local Government Code. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1176
(Vernon 1992).
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are granted broad powers by separate legislative enact-
ments. The State Law pre-emption question turns on
which of these powers is superior.
1. The Texas Cases
No Texas case has specifically discussed the sovereignty
issues which arise when one municipality locates its air-
port within the borders of another municipality. There
have, however, been several cases concerning the extent
and limitations of the powers of Home Rule cities.65
In City of Sweetwater v. Geron 66 the validity of an ordi-
nance by the City of Sweetwater (a home rule city) estab-
lishing a maximum age limit for all city employees was
challenged by a police department employee. At the time
of the enactment of the city ordinance, the Texas Fire-
men's and Policemen's Civil Service Act6 7 provided that
"no rule for the removal or suspension of such employees
shall be valid unless it involves one or more of the follow-
ing grounds," whereupon several grounds for dismissal
were set forth.68 None of the enumerated grounds were
65 See Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.
1975); Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.
1973); City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1964); Glass v. Smith,
244 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1951); Forwood v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.
1948); MJR's Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 792 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, writ denied); City of Lucas v. North Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 724
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Addison v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Wagstaff v. City of Groves, 419 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 354 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
- 380 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1964).
67 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (Vernon 1992).
68 ld. § 5. The approved grounds were:
Conviction of a felony or other crime involving moral turpitude; vio-
lations of the provisions of the charter of said city; acts of incompe-
tency; neglect of duty; discourtesy by said employee to the public or
to fellow employees while said employee is in line of duty; acts of
said employee showing a lack of good moral character; drinking of
intoxicants while on duty, or intoxication while off duty; or whose
conduct was prejudicial to good order; refusal or neglect to pay just
debts; absence without leave; shirking duty, or cowardice'at fires; vi-
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age-related. 69 Additionally, section sixteen of the subject
Act provided that "[n]o employees shall be suspended or
dismissed by the Commission except for violation of the
civil service rules, and except upon a finding by the Com-
mission of the truth of the specific charges against such
employee. ' 70 It was admitted that the employee in ques-
tion had not been charged with violation of any of the
Civil Service Commission rules, nor was he removed
under the procedure set forth in section 16 of the subject
Act.
The court concluded that the subject Act did not pro-
hibit the city from passing an ordinance relating to the
maximum age limit for its firemen and policemen. 7' The
court reasoned that although the constitutional grant of
broad powers to home rule cities can be limited by legisla-
tive acts, the Legislature should make its limiting inten-
tion "appear with unmistakable clarity."' 72 The subject
Act was an example of state pre-emption, but only in the
field of disciplinary removal of firemen and policemen.
Because the subject Act was silent on the matter of maxi-
mum age limits, it could not be said to express the Legis-
lature's clear intention to pre-empt a home rule city's
broad power to regulate in this area.73
Glass v. Smith,74 another Texas Supreme Court case, in-
volves the limitation on the power of a Home Rule city by
the same Civil Service Act involved in City of Sweetwater.75
In Glass, employees of the City of Austin had called for an
initiative election to change the classifications of police-
men and firemen under the subject Act. The city council
refused to call an initiative election, believing that it had
olation of any of the rules and regulations of the Fire Department or
Police Department or of special orders, as applicable.
Id.
69 City of Sweetwater, 380 S.W.2d at 552.
7o TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16 (Vernon 1992).
71 City of Sweetwater, 380 S.W.2d at 552.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 150 Tex. 632, 244 S.W.2d 645 (1951).
75 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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no authority to vary the terms in the subject Act. The
court ordered that the election be held76 and stated that
"[i]f the Legislature had intended that the Civil Service
Commission should supplant the City Council in the exer-
cise of any legislative power it could and should have
made that intent known in clear and unmistakable
language."77
Another Texas case dealing with pre-emption of munic-
ipal home rule power by state law is Lower Colorado River
Authority v. City of San Marcos78 in which San Marcos, a
home rule city, passed an ordinance regulating retail elec-
tric rates charged within the city. The ordinance was in
response to a rate increase by the Lower Colorado River
Authority (LCRA). The LCRA is a conservation and rec-
lamation district created under the authority of Article
XVI, Section 59, of the Texas Constitution and author-
ized to develop and generate water power and electric en-
ergy within its boundaries. 79  The District is also
authorized to distribute and sell the same within and with-
out its boundaries. San Marcos was not within the bound-
aries of the LRCA district.
The court reiterated the rule established in Forwood v.
City of Taylor8° that the power of home rule city is plenary
and that "it is necessary to look to the acts of the Legisla-
ture not for grants of power to such cities but only for
limitations on their powers.8" The question then became
whether Section 8 of the LCRA Act 2 constituted a legisla-
M Glass, 244 S.W.2d at 655.
77 Id. at 652.
78 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975).
79 Id. at 643.
40 147 Tex. 161, 214 S.W.2d 282 (1948).
8 Lower Colo. River Auth., 523 S.W.2d at 643 (quoting Forwood, 214 S.W.2d at
286).
92 Section 8 of the LCRA Act reads as follows:
The Board shall establish and collect rates and other charges for the
sale or use of water, water connections, power, electric energy or
other services sold, furnished, or supplied by the District which fees
and charges shall be reasonable and nondiscriminatory and suffi-
cient to produce revenues adequate; (a) to pay all expenses neces-
sary to the operation and maintenance of the properties and
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tive limitation of the Home Rule powers enjoyed by San
Marcos.83 The court stated that the Home Rule power
may be limited by a general law either by express or im-
plied limitation. 84 However, a limitation will not be im-
plied unless the wording used by the Legislature is "clear
and compelling to that end.85 After reserving to the State
the power to regulate rates, the LCRA Act contains the
proviso that the State will not regulate rates in such a way
as to prejudice bondholders in the LCRA.86 No other lim-
itation was found to be clearly compelled by the wording
of the LCRA Act. 87 Since all powers of the State are dele-
gated to Home Rule cities, San Marcos was authorized to
regulate rates charged by the LCRA subject only to the
single limitation contained in the LCRA Act.88
facilities of the District; (b) to pay the interest on and principal of all
bonds issued under this Act when and as the same shall become due
and payable; (c) to pay all sinking fund and/or reserve fund pay-
ments agreed to be made in respect of any such bonds, and payable
out of such revenues, when and as the same shall become due and
payable; and (d) to fulfill the terms of any agreement made with the
holders of such bonds and/or with any person in their behalf.... It
is the intention of this Act that the rates and charges of the District
shall not be in excess of what may be necessary to fulfill the obliga-
tions imposed upon it by this Act. Nothing herein shall be construed as
depriving the State of Texas of its power to regulate and control fees and/or
charges to be collected for the use of water, water connections, power, electric
energy, or other service, provided that the State of Texas does hereby
pledge to and agree with the purchasers and successive holders of
the bonds issued hereunder that the State will not limit or alter the
power hereby vested in the District to establish and collect such fees
and charges as will produce revenues sufficient to pay the items
specified in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this Section 8, or in
any way to impair the rights or remedies of the holders of the bonds,
or of any person in their behalf, until the bonds, together with the
interest thereon, with interest on unpaid installments of interest and
all costs and expenses in connection with any action or proceedings
by or on behalf of the bondholders and all other obligations of the
District in connection with such bonds are fully met and discharged.
Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 643.
,4 Id. at 645.
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In a vigorous dissent, Justice McGee argued that not
only can power be withdrawn from a home rule city by an
express limitation, but it can also be limited if the provi-
sions of the general law are inconsistent with the power
sought to be exercised by the home rule city.89 There-
fore, it is not possible for the City of San Marcos to exer-
cise any power inconsistent with the LCRA Act. °" It thus
follows that if the LCRA Act authorizes the LCRA to es-
tablish and collect rates, the regulation of rates by San
Marcos would be inconsistent with that authority, and
therefore void. 91 This seems to be a realistic approach to
divining the intentions of the Legislature in the granting
of power under a statute, however it has yet to become
the law of Texas.
In Forwood v. City of Taylor 9 2 the Texas Supreme Court
made it clear that a home rule city's power would not be
encroached upon by every act of the Legislature. 3 In
Forwood the city of Taylor (a Home Rule city) had formed
a nine member Board of Equalization whose duties were
to equalize the taxable value of all property located
within the city. Forwood (a local resident) and others
challenged that the ordinance providing for a nine mem-
ber Board of Equalization was void due to its conflict with
Article 1048 of the Civil Statutes, 4 which provides for the
formation of three member Boards of Equalization. The
I' Id. at 647 (McGee, J., dissenting).
1)0 Id.
91 Id.
92 214 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1948).
;,3 Id. at 284-85.
'14 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1048 (Vernon 1992). The statute reads as
follows:
The councils of cities and towns incorporated under the General Laws
shall within their discretion act as a Board of Equalization. Said
Councils of such cities and towns shall annually at their first meeting
or as soon thereafter as practical exercise such discretion, and if they
so determine they shall have the authority to appoint three (3) com-
missioners, each a qualified voter, a resident, and property owner of





court held the statute inapplicable because the city of Tay-
lor was a home rule city and the subject statute specifically
purported to apply to cities and towns "incorporated
under the General Laws.95 The court made it clear that
although the Legislature has the power to limit the au-
thority of home rule cities, this legislative power will not
be construed liberally.9 6
Another case, City of Lucas v. North Texas Municipal Water
District,97 involved an injunction action by the city of Lucas
to prevent the Water District (formed by the cities of
Plano, Richardson, Allen and McKinney) from construct-
ing a 403-acre wastewater treatment plant partly within
the city of Lucas' corporate limits and partly within its ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction.9 8 The city sought to force the
Water District to comply with applicable city ordinances
before beginning with construction.99
The Water District was formed pursuant to the District
Act' 00 which authorizes the formation of Municipal Water
Districts for the management of waste.10 1 Section 27(1) of
the District Act specifically provides that in the event of a
conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of Sec-
tion 27 and any other law, Section 27 is to be control-
95 Forwood, 214 S.W.2d at 284.
- id. at 285.
97 724 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99 The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the city of Lucas, which is a general law
city of less than 5,000 residents, "consists of 'all the contiguous unincorporated
area, not part of any other city, within one-half (1/2) mile of the corporate limits
of' the City." id. at 814 (quoting TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 3.A(l)
(Vernon 1963)).
City of Lucas, 724 S.W.2d at 814.
'0 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws 96, as amended by Act of April 30, 1975, ch. 90, § 1, sec.
27, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 238.
101 Id. Section 27(a) of the District Act provides, in pertinent part:
In addition to all other powers, the district is authorized to purchase,
construct, acquire, own, operate, maintain, repair, improve, or ex-
tend inside and outside its boundaries, at any location whatsoever,
in the sole discretion of the district, any and all works, improve-
ments, facilities, plants, equipment, and appliances incident, helpful,
or necessary to: .. .(2) collect, transport, process, treat, dispose of,
and control all municipal, domestic, industrial, or communal waste.
Id. The language of this Act is very similar to the language of the Texas Municipal
Airports Act. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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ling. 0 2  The Water District argued that the city
ordinances were pre-empted by the District Act and thus
void because they sought to prevent the Water District
from constructing the treatment plant within the city.' 0 3
The city asserted that the ordinances in question were
reasonable attempts to protect the health and welfare of
the city's residents by insuring that the Water District's
operations were conducted in a safe manner and there-
fore the ordinances were not inconsistent with the District
Act. ' 4 The court held that reasonable city ordinances
that provide for the health and welfare of the city's resi-
dents which are otherwise authorized by law, do not con-
flict with and are not inconsistent with the District Act.10 5
Therefore, a general law city, which does not enjoy the
plenary power of a home rule city, may nevertheless enact
ordinances which control the actions of home rule cities
operating within its boundaries. As long as those ordi-
nances are reasonably related to providing for the health
and welfare of the city's. residents, they will not be found
to be pre-empted by the legislative act authorizing the
home rule cities to operate within its borders.' 0 6
A reasonable action rule similar to that of City of Lucas
was applied in City of Addison v. Dallas Independent School
102 Id. Section 27(l) of the District Act provides:
This section shall be wholly sufficient authority within itself for the
issuance of bonds, the execution of contracts, and the performance
of the other acts and procedures authorized herein by the district,
and all cities, public agencies, and other political subdivisions, with-
out reference to any other law or any restrictions or limitations con-
tained therein, except as herein specifically provided; and in any case
to the extent of any conflict or inconsistency between any provisions of this sec-
tion and any other provisions of law, this section shall prevail and control;
provided, however, that the district and all cities, public agencies,
and other political subdivisions shall have the right to use the provi-
sions of any other laws, not in conflict with the provisions hereof, to
the extent convenient or necessary to carry out any power or author-
ity, express or implied, granted by this section.
Id. (emphasis added).






District 107, but the opposite result obtained.° 8 The Dallas
Independent School District (DISD) decided to establish a
school bus compound to include parking facilities for
sixty school buses, a refueling and repair terminal and
fuel storage tanks. The compound was to be located
within the city of Addison on property already owned by
the DISD. The proposed use violated a zoning ordinance
of the city of Addison, and the DISD brought suit to en-
join the enforcement of the ordinance.
The court's decision was based on the fact that the Leg-
islature had granted particular powers to both the city and
the DISD, and the reasonable exercise of those powers
must not conflict in order to give effect to both grants of
power. 0 9 Here, the DISD's decision to locate its school
facility was found not to be unreasonable based on a pre-
vious Texas Supreme Court decision" 0 which had ruled
that it was not a reasonable exercise of municipal zoning
power to attempt to exclude schools from residential
districts."'
The distinction, therefore, between City of Lucas and City
of Addison is in the burden of proof. In City of Lucas, it fell
upon the Water District to show that the city's zoning or-
dinance was an unreasonable exercise of its police power." " 2
In City of Addison, the Texas Supreme Court had previ-
ously determined that the school district's actions were
reasonable per se, so it was therefore up to the city to show
that its attempted use of zoning power to keep the school
out was reasonable." 13
The use of the reasonable action test is most clearly set
forth in Wagstaff v. City of Groves." 4 In Wagstaff, the plain-
107 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
-o, Id. at 772-73.
10) Id.
11 Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.
1973).
1 Id. at 674.
112 City of Lucas, 724 S.W.2d at 816.
,"I City of Addison, 632 S.W.2d at 772.
-4 419 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tiff was injured when he fell from a ladder set up for him
by employees of the city. Two and one-half months later,
Wagstaff discovered that he had a ruptured disc in his
back and underwent surgery. The city denied his work-
man's compensation claim because the charter of the city
contained a provision requiring written notice be given to
the city within sixty days of an injury as a condition prece-
dent for the recovery of damages for personal injury. The
city of Groves is a home rule city. Wagstaff sought to in-
validate the city's charter provision, claiming that it was
pre-empted by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The court utilized a rule of construction set forth in City
of Beaumont v. Fall," 5 which mandated that, if possible, a
construction should be given to a general law and a city
ordinance which will leave both intact."t 6 A similar rule
was set forth in Cole v. State ex rel. Cobolini,t t 7 which stated
that it was the duty of the court to reconcile two seem-
ingly repugnant laws if at all possible." 8 The Wagstaff
court ruled that a reasonable construction would leave
both the statute and the charter provision in effect." 9
The court found that it was not inconsistent with the op-
eration of the Workmen's Compensation Act to require a
complainant to give the notice of injury required by the
charter provision. 20
11- 116 Tex. 314, 291 S.W. 202 (1927).
11 In the language of the court:
Of course, a general law and a city ordinance will not be held repug-
nant to each other if any other reasonable construction leaving both
in effect can be reached. In other words, both will be enforced if
that be possible under any reasonable construction, just as one gen-
eral statute will not be held repugnant to another unless that is the
only reasonable construction. Chief Justice Phillips has laid down
the test for determining the repugnancy of two general statutes in
the case of Cole v. State ....
Wagstaff, 419 S.W.2d at 443-44 (quoting Beaumont, 291 S.W. at 206).
17 106 Tex. 472, 170 S.W. 1036 (1914).
II In the language of the court: "Though they may seem to be repugnant, if it
is possible to fairly reconcile them, such is the duty of the court. A construction
will be sought which harmonizes them and leaves both in concurrent operation,
rather than destroys one of them." Id. at 1037.
1'.l Wagstaff, 419 S.W.2d at 444.
120 Id.
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To summarize the previous three cases, the court will
attempt to find a reasonable construction of both a Legis-
lative Act and a local law in order that both of them may
be found to be operative and not inconsistent, since by
definition, home rule charters and ordinances do not con-
tain anything repugnant to the Texas Constitution or the
general laws enacted by the Texas Legislature.1 2 1
Finally, in MJR's Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas,122
several businesses in the city which featured topless danc-
ers sought to invalidate a proposed Dallas zoning ordi-
nance123 which sought to add the classification Sexually
Oriented Businesses to the city's comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance. The proposed ordinance provided for licensing
and distance restrictions which would be applicable to
businesses such as the appellants'. 24 The appellants al-
leged, among other things, that prior Texas law already
provided similar regulation and thus pre-empted the
ordinance. 12
Specifically, the appellants argued that the Zoning En-
abling Acts' 26 grant a city the power to divide itself into
zoning districts and to regulate building use inside of
those districts. 27 Also, the Zoning Enabling Acts fail to
specifically provide for a city to regulate distance restric-
tions between buildings based on the type of business
housed therein. 28 Furthermore, the Alcoholic Beverage
Code 2 9 regulates location restrictions regarding busi-
nesses which serve alcoholic beverages. 30 Appellants
therefore asserted that Dallas' attempt to use its zoning
power to impose distance restrictions between sexually
121 Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 354 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
122 792 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
2.3 Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 19,196 (proposed June 12, 1986).
14 MJR's Fare, 792 S.W.2d at 572.
2-5 Id. at 571.
126 TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 211.001 - .013 (Vernon 1988).
127 MJR's Fare, 792 S.W.2d at 573.
128 Id.
12 TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.31, 109.33 (Vernon 1990).
1- MJR's Fare, 792 S.W.2d at 573.
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oriented businesses conflicts with these State statutes and
thus violates the Texas Constitution.' 3'
The court held that Dallas did indeed have the power to
enact ordinances that seek to protect the public safety and
to promote the general welfare of the city, this power be-
ing conferred upon all Texas home rule cities. 32 First, it
was held that Dallas, as a home rule city, need not look to
the Zoning Enabling Acts for a grant of power to regulate
distances between businesses, since home rule cities have
plenary power and need not look to the general laws of
the state for grants of power, but only for restrictions to
their power.' 33 Because the Zoning Enabling Acts were
silent on the issue of distance regulation, they did not pre-
clude the city from enacting a zoning ordinance providing
for such. 3 4 The court noted that the Alcoholic Beverage
code contains provisions that grant power to a city to
place limits on the sale of alcoholic beverages. 35 Because
Dallas' proposed ordinance sought only to regulate a sec-
ondary activity and not the sale of alcohol, the court
found no conflict to exist between the ordinance and the
I' d. Section 5 of the Texas Constitution provides:
Cities having more than five thousand (5000) inhabitants may, by
majority vote of the qualified voters of said city, at an election held
for that purpose, adopt or amend their charters, subject to such limi-
tations as may be prescribed by the Legislature, and providing that
no charter or any ordinance passed under said charter shall contain
any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of
the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State; and cities
may levy, assess and collect such taxes as may be authorized by law
or by their charters; but no tax for any purpose shall ever be lawful
for any one year, which shall exceed two and one-half percent of the
taxable property of such city, and no debt shall ever be created by
any city, unless at the same time provision be made to assess and
collect annually a sufficient sum to pay the interest thereon and cre-
ating a sinking fund of at least two percent thereon; and provided
further, that no city charter shall be altered, amended or repealed
oftener than every two years.
TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
'.2 TEx. CoNsT. art. XI, § 5; MJR's Fare, 792 S.W.2d at 573.
1.4.4 MJR's Fare, 792 S.W.2d at 573.
134 Id.
1.' TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.31, 109.33.
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Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code. 36 The court, therefore,
once again applied the concepts of plenary home rule
power in light of statutory construction aimed at discern-
ing specific limitations of that power.
a. Texas Caselaw Summary
From the foregoing materials, it is clear that Texas
courts have built up a sizable amount of precedent for de-
termining just what powers home rule cities have and how
such powers may be limited by the Legislature. This body
of law may be applied to the DFW Airport controversy in
lieu of specific caselaw dealing with limitations of airport
land use by host cities. The following is a summary of the
legal rules developed in the preceding cases.
Because Texas home rule cities have been given plenary
power by the Texas Constitution to regulate activities
within their borders, 3 7 a legislative act which intends to
limit the powers available to a home rule city must make
such limiting intention appear within the act "with unmis-
takable clarity"'3 M and in "clear and unmistakable lan-
guage." 139 In the absence of an express limitation of
Home Rule power, a legislative intent to diminish such
power will not be implied unless the wording used by the
Legislature is "clear and compelling to that end."' 4 °
A home rule city's power will not be encroached upon
by every act of the Legislature.' 4 ' Also, if a legislative act
pre-empts in one area of a particular field, it does not fol-
low that the act pre-empts the entire field. 42
Even a legislative act which specifically authorizes one
1s MJR's Fare, 792 S.W.2d at 574.
137 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
1s8 City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. 1964).
's9 Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632, 641, 244 S.W.2d 645, 652 (1951).
41) Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex.
1975) (citing Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632, 244 S.W.2d 645 (1951)).
- Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 166, 214 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex.
1948).
142 See generally Lower Colo. River Auth., 523 S.W.2d at 645; City of Sweetwater, 380
S.W.2d 550; Glass, 150 Tex. at 642, 244 S.W.2d at 652.
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city to act within the borders of another city will not pre-
clude the host city from enacting ordinances in conflict
with the act, so long as the ordinances are reasonably re-
lated to providing for the health and welfare of the host
city's residents.' 43 This is the so-called "reasonable ac-
tion" rule. The basis for the rule is that the Legislature
has given grants of power to both parties, and the reason-
able exercise of those powers must not conflict in order to
give effect to both grants of power.' 44 A "general law and
a city ordinance will not be held repugnant to each other
if any reasonable construction leaving both in effect can
be reached."' 45 This results from the fact that, by defini-
tion, home rule ordinances do not contain anything re-
pugnant to the Texas Constitution or the General Laws
enacted by the Legislature. 46
Therefore, Texas home rule cities have plenary power
to regulate activities within their borders. Any legislative
act intending to limit this power must do so either ex-
pressly or impliedly with clear and compelling language.
Even when the legislative act intends to limit the home
rule power, the home rule city still maintains some discre-
tion in the reasonable regulation for the health and wel-
fare of its citizens.
b. Application of Texas Caselaw to the DFW Airport
Controversy
The DFW Airport Board, in establishing, running and
attempting to expand the airport, is acting pursuant to
power granted to such organizations by the Texas Legis-
lature in the Municipal Airports Act.' 4 7 The host cities of
Grapevine, Irving and Euless, in establishing zoning ordi-
,1 City of Lucas v. North Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 724 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
- City of Addison v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 632 S.W.2d 771, 771-73 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1,4 City of Beaumont v. Fall, 116 Tex. 314, 324, 291 S.W. 202, 206 (Tex. 1927).
146 Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 354 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
,47 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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nances which seek to regulate land use within their bor-
ders, are acting pursuant to a legislative grant of
authority delegating all powers of the State of Texas to
home rule cities.' 48 In order that neither piece of legisla-
tion be found to be repugnant to the other, it is necessary
to find a reasonable construction for each that will give
effect to both of them. 49
Under the Texas Municipal Airports Act, the DFW Air-
port Board is specifically authorized to, among other
things, enlarge and improve airports and air navigation
facilities either within or without the territorial limits of
the municipalities composing the Board (i.e. Dallas and
Fort Worth). 50 Such enlargement and improvement is
precisely what the Board is seeking to do with the pro-
posed expansion of DFW Airport. The Board plans to en-
large and improve the airport by extending an existing
runway and building a new runway, as well as several sup-
port buildings.' 5' The expansion construction will take
place wholly outside the territorial limits of Dallas and
Fort Worth and wholly within the territorial limits of the
host cities. ' 52
When a municipality (e.g. Dallas or Fort Worth) oper-
ates an airport within the territorial limits of another mu-
nicipality (e.g. Irving, Grapevine or Euless), the Act
provides that an airport located outside the limits of an
operator's municipality will be under the jurisdiction of
that municipality. 53 The Board can therefore make a case
148 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
1'9 See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
- TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 2 (Vernon 1992).
'-' See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
1.'2 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
, The language of the Act is as follows:
To the extent that an airport or other air navigation facility con-
trolled and operated by a municipality is located outside the territo-
rial limits of the municipality, it shall, subject to Federal and State
laws, rules and regulations, be under the jurisdiction and control of
the municipality controlling or operating it, and no other municipal-
ity shall have any authority to charge or exact a license fee or occu-
pation tax for operations thereon.
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 7(b) (Vernon 1992).
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for its position that the Act expressly grants jurisdiction
over the Airport to the Board.
This position, however, is subject to attack on several
grounds. First, the specific language of the statute may be
read to mean that only the charging of a license fee or
occupation tax for operation of the Airport is prohib-
ited. 5 4 The Act is silent with regard to the pre-emption
of Host City zoning power. Such pre-emption has not
been granted by the Legislature with "clear and unmistak-
able language.' 1 55 In fact, a Texas federal court has al-
ready reached this same conclusion when construing the
same statute in another case. 156 That court concluded
that "[the] problem with the argument is that article 46d-
7 does not prohibit Irving from exercising any authority at
the airport; it prohibits only the charging of a license fee
or occupation tax."'' 5 7
Second, the Act contains an exception to the grant of
jurisdiction to the Board, namely that the Board shall still
be "subject to Federal and State laws, rules and regula-
tions.15 8 Since a home rule city has all of the power of the
State which has not been abrogated by the Legislature, 159
this reservation of the power of regulation to the State can
be reasonably read to include the zoning power that the
State has delegated to each of the host cities over lands
within their territorial limits.
Finally, even if the Act is read to grant the Board exclu-
sive jurisdiction over Airport property, the reasonable ex-
ercise of the Host Cities' zoning powers for the health and
154 Id. (stating that no other municipality shall have any authority to charge or
exact a license fee or occupation tax for operations thereon. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art 46d, § 7(b) (Vernon 1992)).
I.,., Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632, 641, 244 S.W.2d 645, 652 (1951); see supra
note 140 and accompanying text.
156 Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. *1978), aff'd,
801 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub. nom., Whorton v. Surtran Taxicabs,
480 U.S. 931 (1987).
151 Id. at 1040.
'.1 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 47d, § 7(b) (Vernon 1992).
1,111 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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welfare of their citizens would still be given effect.' 60
There has been no allegation by the Board that the sub-
ject zoning ordinances are unreasonable insofar as their
design to protect the health and safety of the residents of
the host cities.' 6'
Therefore, it seems that the pertinent caselaw from the
Texas courts requires that the zoning ordinances of the
host cities be given effect. There is a reasonable interpre-
tation of both the zoning ordinances and the Texas Mu-
nicipal Airports Act which leave both in effect, therefore
that interpretation is to be preferred. The host city zon-
ing ordinances do not appear to be pre-empted by state
law.
2. Exemplary Cases from Other Jurisdictions
Although there appears to be ample caselaw in Texas
dealing with the powers of home rule cities, the limita-
tions thereof and the problems of statutory construction
to resolve conflicts with exercises of home rule power to
enable a Texas court to decide upon the conflict between
DFW Airport and the host cities, it is at least instructive to
examine the outcomes of similar conflicts in other juris-
dictions. Many jurisdictions have previously dealt with at-
tempts by airport proprietor cities to invalidate zoning
ordinances of neighboring cities.
One such case is Aviation Services, Inc. v. Board of Adjust-
ment of Township of Hanover,'62 decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In Aviation Services, the subject airport
was owned by the Town of Morristown but was located on
a 235-acre tract of land within the boundary of the Town-
ship of Hanover. After five years of airport operation, the
Township of Hanover enacted a zoning ordinance which
placed the airport property within a Residence B zone, at
which time the airport became a non-conforming use.
The appellant in this case leased an airport building
' See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
161 See generally Appellant's Brief, supra note 16.
161 119 A.2d 761 (NJ. 1956).
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from the Town of Morristown. When the appellant sought
a building permit from the Township of Hanover to en-
large appellant's maintenance service and flight school
building, the application was denied. The sole issue in
the case was whether the Morristown Municipal Airport
was subject to the zoning ordinance of the Township of
Hanover.163
The State of New Jersey had a 1929 statute very similar
to the Texas Municipal Airports Act. 16 4 The court stated
that an agency or authority which occupies a superior po-
sition in the governmental hierarchy is immune from reg-
ulation by an authority below it in the hierarchy, absent
express statutory language to the contrary. 65 In the in-
stant case, however, neither governmental unit was supe-
rior to the other (as is the case with Dallas, Fort Worth,
Grapevine, Irving and Euless). In such a case, the court
concluded that no governmental immunity exists unless
the Legislative provision which the municipality is operat-
ing under bestows such an immunity. 66
The court found such immunity from the absence of
any language in the act limiting the undertaking of a mu-
nicipal airport, either within or without the borders of the
163 Id. at 763.
164 Compare
[t]he governing body of any municipality may acquire, establish,
construct, own, control, lease, equip, improve, maintain, operate
and regulate airports or landing fields for the use of airplanes and
other aircraft within or without the limits of such municipality and
may use for such purpose or purposes any property, owned or con-
trolled by such municipality, suitable therefor.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:8-2 (West 1991) with
Every municipality is authorized, out of any appropriations or other
moneys made available for such purposes, to plan, establish, de-
velop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regu-
late, protect and police airports and air navigation facilities, either
within or without the territorial limits of such municipality and
within or without the territorial boundaries of this State, including
the construction, installation, equipment, maintenance and opera-
tion at such airports of any buildings and other facilities...
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 2 (Vernon 1992).
165 Aviation Serv., 119 A.2d at 765.
I("i Id.
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municipality, and also in the bestowal of the power of em-
inent domain to the proprietor municipality. 67 These
factors were found to sufficiently reflect a legislative in-
tent of immunity from zoning power for proprietor mu-
nicipalities in the acquisition and maintenance of airport
facilities. 168 The court found itself incumbent to lend a
liberal construction to the Act in order to insure that the
benefits which the Legislature intended to provide to mu-
nicipalities which provide airport facilities are indeed con-
ferred upon them. 169
Significantly, the New Jersey court quoted at length
from the Ohio Court of Common Pleas as a basis for its
decision, concluding that zoning ordinances are subject to
a hierarchy of governmental entity pre-emption.' 70 The
New Jersey court thus recognized the ability of a superior
governmental entity to control the land use of an inferior
governmental entity, and of any governmental entity to
control the land use of a private citizen for the public
good. But the court rejected the notion that the land use
of one governmental entity could be controlled by an-
other absent express legislative empowerment to do so.
Another case which is on point is also from New Jersey
and involves the same litigants. Town of Morristown v.
167 Id. at 766.
1 " Id.
169 Id. at 767.
170 The New Jersey Court stated:
Zoning ordinances are upheld on the theory that they bear a real and
substantial relation to the public welfare. Their validity rests upon
the principle that the exercise of rights incident to the ownership of
private property may be restricted in the interest of the general wel-
fare of the inhabitants of the municipality. Through the medium of
zoning ordinances municipalities may insist that private rights in real
property yield to the general good of the community, but the pre-
sumption is that the use of public property for public purposes is
designed to promote the general welfare also, and no case or textual
authority has been cited that supports the view that municipalities by
zoning ordinances may restrict or limit the use of public property for
public purposes.
Id. at 766 (quoting State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d
698, 705 (Ohio 1947)).
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Township of Hanover '7 ' was described by the author of the
opinion as "another round in the never-ending struggle
between the Town of Morristown and the Township of
Hanover relating to the use of the Morristown Municipal
Airport owned and operated by Morristown on its lands in
Hanover.'172 The litigious history of these two cities over
the airport can be traced in no fewer than six reported
cases. 73 In the present case, Morristown sued to invali-
date an amendment 74 to the zoning ordinance of Hano-
ver which sought to limit the permitted uses of the lands
in the Airport District.
The New Jersey court held that the New Jersey Airports
Act 75 "establishes an island of immunity from zoning
regulations for property operated and used for the pri-
mary purpose of a municipal airport or for uses which are
reasonably accessory or incidental to that primary pur-
pose." 176 The court determined that the amended ordi-
nance invaded this immunity by prohibiting uses which
17, 402 A.2d 983 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
172 Id. at 984-85.
173 Id. at 985.
,4 Hanover, N.J., Ordinance No. 8-78 (May 11, 1978). The ordinance
provided:
919. A AIRPORT DISTRICT
A. PRIMARY INTENDED USE.
This zone district is designed for the operation of an airport for gen-
eral aviation, other than for commercial air carriers... and accessory
uses customarily incident thereto. Permitted uses, including primary
and accessory uses, shall be limited to a landing strip, control tower,
hangars, offices for airport personnel, equipment for the supply of
fuel to aircraft, and facilities for the repair, maintenance and testing
of aircraft permanently based at the airport . ...
B. PROHIBITED USE. All uses are prohibited other than those
uses which have been specifically permitted in Section 919 A of this
ordinance. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to permit
banks, service stations, hotels, motels, office buildings, restaurants,
terminal facilities for commercial air carriers, and the repair, mainte-
nance and testing of aircraft, other than on an emergency basis, of
airplanes which are not permanently based, as defined in (A) above,
within this zone district.
Id.
175 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:8-2 (West 1991).
171, Town of Morristown, 402 A.2d at 986.
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were appropriate for the operation of an airport.'7 A
comparison of the language of the New Jersey Airports
Act and the Texas Municipal Airports Act reveals that the
two statutes are remarkably similar. 78  This similarity
would provide a sound basis for the Texas courts to
adopt the New Jersey view if they so chose.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has arrived at the
same conclusion in a case involving another very similar
statute. In Petition of City of Detroit,179 the Township of
Warren sought to block the condemnation of land by the
city of Detroit for construction and operation of an air-
port. The zoning ordinance of Warren Township prohib-
ited "the use or occupancy of any lands or premises for an
airport" in the portion of the Township where the pro-
posed airport was to be constructed. 80
The Michigan court found the zoning ordinance to be
void and unenforceable due to its direct conflict with the
Michigan Airports Act.' 8' Because this statute authorized
1"7 Id.
178 Compare
[t]he governing body of any municipality may acquire, establish,
construct, own, control, lease, equip, improve, maintain, operate
and regulate airports or landing fields for the use of airplanes and
other aircraft within or without the limits of such municipality and
may use for such purpose or purposes any property, owned or con-
trolled by such municipality, suitable therefor.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:8-2 (West 1991) with
Every municipality is authorized, out of any appropriations or other
moneys made available for such purposes, to plan, establish, de-
velop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regu-
late, protect and police airports and air navigation facilities, either
within or without the territorial limits of such municipality and
within or without the territorial boundaries of this State, including
the construction, installation, equipment, maintenance and opera-
tion at such airports of any buildings and other facilities. ...
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 2 (Vernon 1992).
179 14 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. 1944).
180 Id. at 142.
1, Compare
The state administrative board or the legislative body of any city or
village or township in this state is hereby authorized to acquire, own,
control, lease, equip, improve, operate and regulate landing fields,
seaplane harbors and airports for aeroplane and other aircraft either
within or without the limits of said cities and villages . ...
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the city to acquire land for operation of an airport, either
within or without the city limits, the township ordinance
prohibiting the use of land in the zoning district for an
airport was void. 82
Finally, in City of Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport
Authority,'"3 an action was brought in the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas by the city of Heath to enjoin the expan-
sion of a regional airport located within its city limits.
The city attempted, among other things, to prevent the
regional airport from expanding onto land already owned
by the Regional Airport Authority and also to require ap-
proval by the city planning commission prior to any
expansion.
The Ohio court began its discussion by quoting the
general rule that zoning ordinances may not restrict or
limit the use of public property for public purposes. 184
The court recognized that Chapter 308 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code, which details the method of creating regional
airport authorities, indicates the public nature of such au-
thorities. 85 Such public nature stems from the fact that
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 4829 (1929)(current version at MICH. COMP. LAws § 259.126
(1990)) with
Every municipality is authorized, out of any appropriations or other
moneys made available for such purposes, to plan, establish, de-
velop, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regu-
late, protect and police airports and air navigation facilities, either
within or without the territorial limits of such municipality and
within or without the territorial boundaries of this State, including
the construction, installation, equipment, maintenance and opera-
tion at such airports of any buildings and other facilities ....
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 2 (Vernon 1992).
182 Petition of City of Detroit, 14 N.W.2d at 142.
-'s 237 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 1967).
184 Id. at 178. The court quoted from Helsel. See supra note 170 for the full text
of the quote.
Through the medium of zoning ordinances municipalities may insist
that private rights in real property yield to the general good of the
community, but the presumption is that the use of public property
for public purposes is designed to promote the general welfare also,
and no case or textual authority has been cited, that supports the
view that municipalities may restrict or limit the use ofpublic property
for public purposes.
',' City of Heath, 237 N.E.2d at 178.
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the regional airport authority is delegated the same pow-
ers the governing counties might have exercised, its per-
sonnel are considered public employees, and the monies
for its operation come from the county general fund. 8 6
From these facts, the court concluded that since the re-
gional airport authority had been delegated by statute to
use the power of eminent domain to acquire land, the use
of that land for public airport purposes could not be pre-
vented by zoning ordinances of the host municipality.18 7
On the second issue of whether the Regional Airport
Authority was required to secure approval from the city
planning commission prior to exercising its expansion
program, the court looked to the statute which set forth
the powers and duties of city planning commissions. 8 8
The Ohio court found it significant that the statute specifi-
cally required recommendation from the planning com-
mission for the location of aviation fields but did not
include such aviation fields in its list of facilities which re-
quire prior approval by the planning commission before
construction.' 8 9 The Court therefore held that the Re-
gional Airport Authority did not have to secure approval
from the city planning commission before expanding the
airport. ' 90
6 ld.
',7 Id. at 179.
" OHio REV. ANN. CODE § 713.02 (Anderson 1991). The statute directs that:
[the planning commission shall make] recommendations for the general
location, character and extent of streets, alleys, ways, viaducts,
bridges, waterways, waterfronts, subways, boulevards, parkways,
parks, playgrounds, aviation fields, and other public grounds, ways
and open spaces; the general location of public buildings and other
public property; the general location and extent of public utilities
and terminals, whether publicly or privately owned or operated, for
water, light, sanitation, transportation, communication, power, and
other purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
The statute further provides that the location, character and extent of the fol-
lowing facilities must be approved by the planning commission prior to construc-
tion: public building or structure, street, boulevard, parkway, park, playground,
public ground, canal, river front, harbor, dock wharf, bridge, viaduct, tunnel, or
other public way, ground, works, or utility. Id. (emphasis added).
'; City of Heath, 237 N.E.2d at 179.
I Id. at 180.
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a. Foreign Jurisdiction Caselaw Summary
From this brief survey of relevant decisions from for-
eign jurisdictions, it is apparent that several other courts
have dealt with attempts by host municipalities to enact
ordinances to control the land use of airport lands within
their boundaries but owned by other municipalities.' 9 ' In
fact, in light of the voluminous caselaw on this subject in
other jurisdictions, it seems incredible that this issue has
never before been decided in Texas. The following is a
brief summary of the logic and rules developed in the rep-
resentative cases selected for inclusion herein.
Although not dispositive of the Texas case that is the
subject of this comment, it is instructive to note that many
foreign jurisdictions have expressly adopted a theory of a
hierarchy of governmental entity pre-emption. Under this
theory, the rights of municipalities that occupy a lower
position in the governmental hierarchy must yield to the
rights of municipalities that occupy a superior position.192
In the case where the litigants occupy the same position in
the governmental entity hierarchy, the foreign municipal-
ity has no immunity from the zoning ordinances of the
host city unless such immunity is conferred upon the for-
eign municipality by express statutory language in the
statute that the foreign municipality is operating under. 9 3
Such immunity may be inferred from the absence of any
limiting language in the statute authorizing the undertak-
ing, as well as the bestowal of the power of eminent do-
main to the proprieter municipality. 94
In such situations, courts are likely to give a liberal con-
struction to the statutes under consideration in order to
insure that whatever benefits the Legislature intended to
See generally Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of the Township of
Hanover, 119 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1956); Town of Morristown v. Township of Hano-
ver, 402 A.2d 983 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); In re Petition of City of De-
troit, 14 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. 1944); City of Heath v. Licking County Regional
Airport Auth., 237 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 1967).
192 Aviation Serv., 119 A.2d at 765.
1,1) Id.
1,04 Id. at 766.
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confer upon municipalities which undertake to provide
airport services are indeed conferred upon them. 95
Another significant finding from the foreign jurisdic-
tions is the notion that land use and zoning laws are pri-
marily intended to restrict the rights of private property
owners when such restriction is in the interest of the gen-
eral welfare of the municipality's residents as a whole. 196
Therefore, municipal use of zoning ordinances to restrict
the utilization of public property is not favored by the
courts. 197 Thus, courts have rejected the notion that the
land use of one governmental entity could be controlled
by another absent express legislative empowerment, be-
cause land use by a governmental entity is inherently for
public purposes.
In a similar vein, if the court relies upon a legislative
grant of immunity from zoning ordinances to insulate the
proprietor municipality from control by the host munici-
pality, even land uses reasonably related or otherwise inci-
dental to the primary purpose of the empowering
legislative act qualify for such immunity. 98 Therefore,
zoning ordinances that prohibit uses appropriate for air-
port operation invade the Legislature's grant of immunity
and are void.' 99 This idea has been applied liberally in
some jurisdictions, even to the point of concluding that if
a statute authorizes a city to acquire land for the opera-
tion of an airport, either within or without its territorial
limits, then a zoning ordinance prohibiting the use of
such land for an airport is void. ° °
In cases where the legislative act empowering proprie-
tor municipalities also grants the power of eminent do-
I,- Id. at 767.
9. Id. at 766; see also State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d
698, 705 (Ohio 1947).
"17 Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Township of Hanover, 119
A.2d 761, 766 (NJ. 1956); see also Helsel, 79 N.E.2d at 705.
I' Town of Morristown v. Township of Hanover, 402 A.2d 983, 986 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
1"i Id.
2 0 Petition of City of Detroit, 14 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Mich. 1944).
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main to acquire land for airport purposes, the use of such
land for public airport purposes cannot be prevented by
zoning ordinances of the host municipality. °2 0 Finally, in
keeping with the apparent willingness of courts to con-
strue statutes liberally in order to prevent restrictions
upon airport establishment, operation, and expansion, at
least one court has found that city planning commission
approval was not necessary prior to airport construction
because airports and air fields were not specifically listed
in the statute empowering the city planning
commission. o2
Therefore, foreign jurisdictions have developed a no-
tion of the governmental entity hierarchy, in which munic-
ipalities that are lower in the hierarchy must yield to the
rights of those that are superior. When the municipalities
are on even footing, the host municipality may control the
land use of the proprietor municipality unless immunity
has been granted to the proprietor municipality by the
legislative act under which it operates. Such immunity is
generally liberally inferred. There is a presumption that
zoning and land use ordinances that attempt to prohibit
publicly owned land from being used for public purposes
are void. Such presumption also applies to land uses
which are incidental or otherwise reasonably related to
statutorily empowered land use. Also, a grant of the
power of eminent domain has been seen as a prohibition
against its limitation by zoning ordinances. Finally, if a
city planning commission is statutorily authorized to re-
quire its approval before construction upon land within its
jurisdiction, airports and air fields have been found to be
exempt from such approval unless the authorizing statute
specifically lists them among its subject classifications.
10, City of Heath v. Licking County Regional Airport Auth., 237 N.E.2d 173,
179 (Ohio 1967).
202 Id. at 179.
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b. Application of Foreign Caselaw to the DFW Airport
Controversy
The survey of caselaw from foreign jurisdictions
presented herein is particularly relevant to the present lit-
igation. This is because the Texas Municipal Airports
Act20 3 provides that the Act is to be construed, if possible,
to reconcile it with other laws of Texas, the other states,
and the federal government that deal with municipal
airports.2 °4
As previously noted, the DFW Airport Board, in estab-
lishing, running and attempting to expand the airport, is
acting pursuant to power granted by the Texas Legisla-
ture in the Municipal Airports Act.2 °5 The Act grants the
DFW Airport Board the same powers that Dallas and Fort
Worth have if acting alone. Therefore, the DFW Airport
Board occupies the same position in the governmental hi-
erarchy as Dallas and Fort Worth. 6 That position, how-
ever, does not give the DFW Airport Board any advantage
in the present case because all of the parties involved are
incorporated by their charters as Texas Home Rule cities.
Therefore all five of the litigants occupy the same position
in the governmental entity hierarchy even though Dallas
and Fort Worth are vastly more populous than Irving,
Grapevine and Euless.
Where, as here, the litigants occupy the same position
in the governmental entity hierarchy, immunity from land
203 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46d (Vernon 1992).
2- Section 19 of the Act states:
This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to make uniform
so far as possible the laws and regulations of this State and other
States and of the government of the United States having to do with
the subject of municipal airports.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 19 (Vernon 1992).
205 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
206 Section 14(c) of the Act states:
... such board may exercise on behalf of its constituent public agen-
cies all the powers of each with respect to such airport, air navigation
facility or airport hazard area, subject to the limitations of Subsec-
tion (d) of this Section.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d, § 14(c) (Vernon 1992).
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use control may be granted to the foreign municipality by
express language in the Act.2 °7 In the present case, the
Act is silent.2 0 8 However, this fact is balanced by the ab-
sence of any limiting language in the Act, which implies
that the powers conferred may not be emasculated by lo-
cal ordinance. 9
Another factor which may favor the DFW Airport Board
is that bestowal of eminent domain to the proprietor mu-
nicipality may imply immunity from host municipality
zoning restrictions. Dallas and Fort Worth, and therefore
the DFW Airport Board, have been granted the power of
eminent domain. 1 0 However, this grant of eminent do-
main carries less weight because it is not made within the
statute granting the power to establish an airport (the Act)
and also because the language "inside or outside the mu-
nicipality ' 21 ' does not positively grant the authority when
the municipality is operating within the boundaries of an-
other municipality. Because courts are likely to give a lib-
eral construction to the statutes under consideration in
order to insure that whatever benefits that the Legislature
intended to confer upon municipalities that undertake to
provide airport services are indeed conferred upon
them,21 2 it is plausible that a court that is sympathetic to
the DFW Airport Board could find enough justification
from these facts to grant immunity.
Another factor in favor of the DFW Airport Board is
that foreign jurisdictions have expressed the opinion that
zoning laws are for restrictions on private property for the
207 Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Township of Hanover, 119
A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 1956).
208 See supra notes 52-55 and related text.
2,0. Aviation Serv., 119 A.2d at 766.
21, The Texas Local Government Code provides:
When the governing body of a municipality considers it necessary,
the municipality may exercise the right of eminent domain for a pub-
lic purpose to acquire public or private property, whether located
inside or outside the municipality, for any of the following purposes:
(1) the providing, enlarging, or improving of ... [an] airport ....
TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 251.001(a) (Vernon 1992).




public good and are therefore void when used to restrict
public property used for public purposes. 1 3 Therefore,
some foreign jurisdictions would consider the use of zon-
ing ordinances by the host cities to restrict land use at
DFW Airport void. This immunity would also extend to
land uses reasonably related or otherwise incidental to
airport operation. 1 4
In light of the number of decisions from foreign juris-
dictions which uphold the right of one municipality to op-
erate an airport free from restriction in another
municipality, it is perhaps not surprising that the DFW
Airport Board seems to have the better case when rules
from these foreign jurisdictions are applied to the present
facts. But the converse is also true: in light of the strong
Texas tradition to grant broad powers to home rule cities
within their own borders, it is not surprising that the host
cities appear to have a stronger case when the rules devel-
oped in Texas courts are applied. It is significant to note
that the trial court opinion in the present DFW Airport
case did not refer to a single non-Texas case when dis-
cussing the issue of state law pre-emption. 5
IV. FEDERAL LAW PRE-EMPTION
A. THE FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION STANDARD
As a general principle, the federal system of govern-
ment in the United States allows sovereign states to freely
regulate their residents and the land within their borders
using the general police powers reserved to the states. In
Texas, this power has been delegated to home rule cities
with respect to action within their own borders.2 6 How-
ever, the federal government, acting under authority of
213 Id.; see also State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d 698,
705 (Ohio 1947) (zoning power restricted to regulation of private lands).
214 Town of Morristown v. Township of Hanover, 402 A.2d 983, 986 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
21-1 Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving, No. 90-4298-I (Dist.
Ct. of Dallas County, 162nd Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 8, 1991).
21,, See supra notes 57-64 and related text.
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the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, may
choose to pre-empt state law in an area in which it has
jurisdiction.2 17
Generally, there are three situations in which state law
is pre-empted by federal law.21 8 First, Congress may ex-
plicitly define within the statute the extent of state law
pre-emption. 2' 9 Because federal pre-emption is entirely a
question of the intent of Congress when acting within its
221powers, 0 the Supreme Court has made it clear that
"when Congress has made its intent known through
explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy
one."
22 1
Second, federal pre-emption may be found in an area
where Congress has failed to make an express declaration,
if Congress is regulating a field that it intended the fed-
eral government to occupy exclusively. 22 Congressional
intent to pre-empt can be inferred from a "scheme of
federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it,"' 223 or where a congressional act
"touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. 22 4
Although the Supreme Court has found federal pre-emp-
tion by inference where it is adequately supported by fed-
eral statutory and regulatory schemes,225 it has stated that
where "the field which Congress is said to have pre-
empted [regulates areas that] have been traditionally oc-
211 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause commands that "[tihis
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the land." Id.
218 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).
219 Id.; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983)(Congress
may explicitly define preemption limits.).
220 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988).
22, English, 496 U.S. at 79.
222 Id.
223 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
224 Id.
22.5 English, 496 U.S. at 79.
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cupied by the states, "226 congressional intent of federal
pre-emption must be " 'clear and manifest.' ,,227 On the
other hand, a distinctive federal interest in a particular
field is a significant factor in establishing pre-emption in
that field.228
Finally, a state law is always pre-empted to the extent
that it is in conflict with federal law. The court will there-
fore find pre-emption "where it is impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal require-
ments. ' 229  Similarly pre-emption will also be found
where a state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress. 2 30 The key inquiry, therefore, in any
determination of pre-emption, is always whether Con-
gress intended that federal regulation supersede state
law.23 '
While Congress has not expressly pre-empted all regu-
lation within the air industry, it is beyond dispute that it
has certainly promulgated, over the last thirty years, vast
quantities of statutory regulation in the area.
B. FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATION
Beginning in 1958, Congress began passing a series of
wide-ranging legislation in the area of air transporta-
tion.232 The underlying theme of most of Congress' regu-
226 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)(quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
227 Id.
22, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 508 n.4 (1988).
229 English, 496 U.S. at 79; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
230 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also California v. ARC
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
747 (1981).
2.11 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 476
U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
2.2 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1981)); Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 4901 (1988)); Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. IX, subtit. D, § 93C 1, 104 Stat. 1388-78
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lation has been to provide some type of uniformity for the
national air traffic community. Early on, Congress recog-
nized that the national character of commercial airline op-
erations, such as connecting flights and hub operations,
meant that restrictive local regulations in one area of the
country can seriously and directly affect air travel
throughout the nation.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958233 grants exclusive
and complete authority over the nation's navigable air-
space to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).234
The Federal Aviation Act also gives the FAA the authority
to regulate air navigation facilities; certify aircraft, airmen,
commercial air carriers, and airports; and regulate the de-
sign and manufacture of aircraft. 35 It is clear that with
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Congress intended to
reserve a large portion of aviation regulation to the fed-
eral government. Congress realized that air travel in-
volved serious safety concerns and that the development
of national standards were in the best interests of the
nation.
However, among all of the particularly defined areas
which Congress singled out for exclusive regulation by
(codified as 49 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988)); Pub. L. No. 91-258, tit. 1, 84 Stat. 219 (codi-
fied as 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988)); Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. V, §§ 501-32, 96 Stat.
671 (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988)); Pub. L. No. 100-508, 101 Stat. 1486
(codified as 49 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988)).
2 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988).
254 Id. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) provides in part:
The Administrator ... is authorized and directed to develop plans
for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the navigable air-
space; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use of the naviga-
ble airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations as he may
deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the effi-
cient utilization of such airspace ....
49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1988). 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) provides in part:
The Administrator . . . is further authorized and directed to pre-
scribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of aircraft,
for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, for the
protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the effi-
cient utilization of the navigable airspace ....
49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1988).
235 Id. §§ 1348, 1349(c), 1353, 1371, 1421-22, 1429-30, 1432.
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the FAA, land use regulation of airport property is con-
spicuously absent. It seems fair to argue that Congress
did not intend to exert its influence over the entire avia-
tion field because it went to such great pains to detail ex-
actly which areas it was carving out for FAA control. This
conclusion is evidenced by the testimony of Senator
Michael Monroney, the Federal Aviation Act's author,
during Senate hearings on the Act. Senator Monroney
testified that the Act gave the FAA control over the navi-
gable airspace, but he noted that the federal government
was exerting no control over ground space, and that
"[c]ertainly that is the intent of the act."236
One area that Congress seems to have left no doubt as
to its intent to pre-empt state law is in the area of aircraft
noise regulation. 7 The Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of
1968238 gives authority over the regulation of aircraft
noise emissions to the FAA, which is directed to consult
with the Environmental Protection Agency (the
"EPA"). 23 9 Further regulation of aircraft noise was pro-
vided by Congress in the Noise Control Act of 1972.24o
The Supreme Court, in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Ter-
minal'2 4 1 determined that these regulations by Congress
of aircraft noise were intended to pre-empt state and local
regulation. 242 The Court made such pre-emption clear
when it stated that "[i]t is the pervasive nature of the
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us
236 Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 279 (1958)(statement of Sen. Monroney).
237 See generally Tom Neuhoff, Jr., Obstacles to Increasing Airspace: Jumping Through
Environmental Law Hoops, 58J. AIR L. & CoM. 221 (1992).
238 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1988).
239 Id. § 1431(b)(1) provides that:
[i]n order to afford present and future relief and protection to the
public health and welfare from aircraft noise and sonic boom, the
FAA, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and
with the EPA, shall prescribe and amend standards for the measure-
ment of aircraft noise and sonic boom ....
Id.
40 42 U.S.C. § 4901 (1988).
24, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
242 Id. at 633.
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to conclude that there is pre-emption. ' ' 243 Although this
seems to be a clear finding of federal pre-emption, the
case is not really that clear. The Aviation Safety and
Noise Abatement Act of 1979 was passed subsequent to
the Burbank decision and seems to contain express lan-
guage by Congress that some portion of aircraft noise
regulation is still retained by the states: "control of com-
patible land use around airports is a key tool in limiting
the number of citizens exposed to unacceptable noise im-
pacts, and should remain exclusively in the control of
State and local governments. 244
The FAA, in formulating its regulations implementing
the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 ex-
pressly stated that local land use regulation was not pre-
empted.245 Congress may have moved further toward ex-
plicit pre-emption, however, with the recently enacted
Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990246 and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto.24 7 The Airport Noise and
Capacity Act of 1990 details several Congressional find-
ings which point to a strong national interest in federal
control of aircraft noise. 24 s At the same time, however,
the same Act also includes language that seems to leave
243 Id.
244 S. Rep. No. 52, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
89, 91.
245 46 Fed. Reg. 8320 (1981)(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 150). The regulation
states in part:
The ANSA Act requires the Secretary to prescribe standardized
methods of measuring noise and noise exposure at airports, and to
identify the land uses which are normally compatible with various
noise exposures. It does not preempt [sic], but reinforces the appro-
priate exercise of local authority and responsibility for airport noise
abatement and land use planning, zoning or the exercise of related
police powers.
Id.
46 Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. IX, subtit. D, § 9301, 104 Stat. 1378-88 (codified as
49 U.S.C. § 2151).
247 56 Fed. Reg. 48,628 (1991)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
248 49 U.S.C. §§ 2151(3) and (5). Congress found that a "noise policy must be
implemented at the national level." Id. § 2151(3). Congress also found that
"[c]ommunity noise concerns have led to uncoordinated and inconsistent restric-




room for local regulation.249 Determination of the status
of federal pre-emption in the area of aircraft noise regula-
tion in light of the congressional acts passed since Burbank
will have to wait until a similar challenge is again brought
before the courts.
Another area that Congress has been active in regulat-
ing is the expansion of the nation's airport capacity. This
is an area of regulation that has particular bearing upon
the litigation that is the subject of this Comment. In
1970, Congress enacted the Airport and Airway Develop-
ment Act. 250 This act required the Secretary of Transpor-
tation to oversee the development of public airports and
also gave the Secretary the power to give grants to state
and local governments for development of public air-
ports.2 5' These grants were made in return for the federal
government being given extensive control over the selec-
tion of the airport's location, layout, design and environ-
mental compatibility.2 52 These grants were funded by an
Airport and Airway Trust Fund.253
The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 was
eventually replaced by the Airport and Airway Improve-
ment Act of 1982,254 which was further amended by the
Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of
1987.255 These federal regulations require that any air-
port construction or expansion must comply with a myr-
iad of environmental regulations under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),256 including
249 49 U.S.C. § 2153(h). This section states that nothing in the Airport Noise
and Capacity Act of 1990 "shall be deemed to eliminate, invalidate or supersede
existing laws with respect to airport noise or access restrictions by local authori-
ties." Id.
20Pub. L. No. 91-258, tit. I, 84 Stat. 219 (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 1701).
251 Id.
252 49 U.S.C. §§ 1716(c)-(e), 1718(a)(3), 1718(a)(4) & 1719 (repealed and
superseded).
253 49 U.S.C. § 1742 (1988).
254 Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. V, §§ 501-32, 96 Stat. 671 (codified as 49 U.S.C.
§ 2201).
255 Pub. L. No. 100-508, 101 Stat. 1486 (codified as 49 U.S.C. § 2210).
256 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321).
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the filing of an environmental impact statement.2 57
While none of these congressional acts explicitly state
that the federal government intends to pre-empt this area
of the law, they do present a credible argument that, taken
as a whole, they represent an imposing amount of federal
regulation in an area which is uniquely suited to control
under Congress' Commerce clause power over interstate
commerce.
C. FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION SUMMARY
The federal regulations cited in the preceding section
clearly mandate that state and local governments may not
attempt to allocate or control airspace, impose local rules
for air traffic, create safety regulations concerning the op-
eration of aircraft, or prohibit or mandate particular flight
patterns. This prohibition is mandated because such local
laws would directly conflict with federal regulation and
would thus be pre-empted.25  But the case against local
regulation of land use at a public airport is not as clearly
pre-empted by federal law. In fact, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, in his dissenting opinion in City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal Inc. ,259 determined that the majority
opinion did not stand for the proposition that local gov-
ernments were pre-empted from using their police pow-
ers to regulate land use at public airports.26 ° Many other
25, For a cogent discussion of the entire regulation process of airports under
NEPA, see generally Neuhoff, supra note 237, at 221.
211, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see also California v.
ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Con-
servation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 747 (1981); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
2.9 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
2-6 Id. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
A local governing body could.., use its traditional police power to
prevent the establishment of a new airport or the expansion of an
existing one within its territorial jurisdiction by declining to grant
the necessary zoning for such a facility. Even though the local gov-
ernment's decision in each case were motivated entirely because of
the noise associated with airports, I do not read the Court's opinion
ZONING CONTROL
judicial decisions since Burbank have supported this
view. 26 ' It therefore seems safe to say that the zoning or-
dinances at issue here262 do not involve subject matter
which has been federally preempted by Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion reached by this author after the forego-
ing analysis is the same as that reached by the trial court
judge. 63 The pertinent caselaw from the Texas courts re-
quires that the zoning ordinances of the host cities be
given effect. There is a reasonable interpretation of both
the zoning ordinances and the Texas Municipal Airports
Act which will leave both in effect; therefore that interpre-
tation is to be preferred. The host city zoning ordinances
do not appear to be pre-empted by state law.
Additionally, the zoning ordinances at issue here26 do
not appear to involve subject matter which has been fed-
erally preempted by Congress, because they do not in-
volve local regulation of the navigable airspace or aircraft
safety.
as indicating that such action would be prohibited by the Supremacy
Clause merely because the Federal government has undertaken the
responsibility for some aspects of aircraft noise control.
ld.
261 See, e.g., Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 219 (8th Cir.
1990)("We see no conflict between a city's regulatory power over land use, and
the federal regulation of airspace, and we have found no case recognizing a con-
flict."); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1313-14 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)("As we read City of Burbank, Congress
has pre-empted only local regulation of the source of aircraft noise. Local govern-
ments may adopt abatement plans that do not impinge on aircraft operations.");
Faux-Burhans v. County Comm'rs of Fredrick County, 674 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Md.
1987), aff'd, 859 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989)(hold-
ing local regulation requiring special use permit for airport not pre-empted); Air
Transp. Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975)(holding Cali-
fornia regulation of aircraft noise level standards not pre-empted).
262 See supra note 3.
26- Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving, Texas, No. 90-4298-I
(Dist. Ct. of Dallas County, 162d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 8, 1991).
2464 See supra note 3.
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